In the month since Donald Trump’s inauguration, the new US administration’s foreign policy has focused on attempts to broker a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia. This admirable initiative is in its infancy, with trial balloons being launched daily. For now, the Trump White House appears to favor a compromise peace that would establish a neutral Ukraine without explicit security guarantees from the country’s Western partners. This formula is sometimes called “Finlandization,” a reference to Finland’s experience as a neutral country on the front lines during the Cold War.
Finland’s status in the Cold War reflects the reality of the country’s relations with the USSR. Following the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939 and the outbreak of World War II, the Soviet authorities began demanding territory from the Finns. The Kremlin accompanied this with a disinformation campaign, calling Finland’s leaders a “reactionary fascist clique.”
In November 1939, the Red Army invaded Finland. The Finns fought bravely in the three-month Winter War, inflicting more than 300,000 casualties on the Soviets and suffering about 70,000 themselves. However, the USSR ultimately prevailed and annexed more than ten percent of Finnish territory. This story will seem eerily familiar to Ukrainians today.
In the decades following World War II, Finland was bound by treaty neutrality with Moscow but remained an independent state with a market economy. The restrictions placed on Finland during this period hindered the country’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic community and became known as Finlandization. In essence, Finland was forced to cede territory and adopt a Kremlin-friendly form of geopolitical neutrality in exchange for nominal independence.
Some in Washington and elsewhere now see the “Finlandization” format of neutrality as a suitable model for Ukraine. This includes influential members of the Trump administration. But proponents of this approach ignore the obvious differences between Soviet policy toward Finland and the Putin regime’s goals in Ukraine. While the USSR had limited territorial ambitions in Finland and was much more focused on Cold War competition with the United States and Western Europe, today’s Russia is fully committed to erasing Ukrainian statehood and national identity.
The strongest accusation of Finlandization has come from Finland itself. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Finns quickly ended decades of neutrality by joining the European Union in 1995. When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Finnish authorities went even further and applied for NATO membership. Finland’s entry into the alliance in 2023 marked the final stage in the country’s rejection of Finlandization.
Rather than imposing neutrality on Ukraine, the country’s partners should seek to create a security environment that prevents further Russian aggression and allows Ukrainians to determine their own future. After eleven years of Russian military aggression and three years of full-scale invasion, pressuring Ukraine to accept Finlandization on the Kremlin’s terms would be tantamount to forcing a victim of abuse to live with her abuser. Such an unfair settlement would be self-defeating and could also significantly undermine the international standing of the United States for years to come.
Despite the obvious problems with a peace deal that imposes neutrality on Ukraine, the new US administration has begun the negotiating process with Russia by proactively offering the Kremlin a series of concessions, such as excluding Ukraine from NATO membership. US officials appear intent on avoiding anything that might offend the Russians, as they seek to give Putin a face-saving opportunity. This approach is unlikely to produce a viable long-term peace agreement. Instead, it risks emboldening Putin to raise his demands.
The alternative to Kremlin-friendly neutrality is clear. Ukraine seeks binding security guarantees from its Western partners and an invitation to join NATO. Kyiv’s vision of sustainable peace offers obvious advantages to the West. At a time when the United States is calling on Europeans to take greater responsibility for their own security, closer defense ties with Ukraine would be an important asset. With more than a million soldiers and unique combat experience on the twenty-first-century battlefield, Ukraine’s inclusion would dramatically increase the size and effectiveness of NATO forces in Europe, while allowing the United States to potentially withdraw.
Integrating Ukraine into the Western security architecture will bring lasting peace to Europe because it will project power against Russia, which is the only language Vladimir Putin understands. It is easy to broker a temporary peace deal by appeasing aggression, as Neville Chamberlain demonstrated in Munich in 1938. However, the long-term consequences are likely to be disastrous. The Trump administration seems well aware of this, and has declared that it is committed to achieving peace through force. The question is whether this principle will now apply to negotiations with Russia over the fate of Ukraine.
Brian Mefford is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He has lived and worked in Ukraine since 1999.
Source: euractiv.com
