The conclusion that many observers draw from the 2025 Munich Security Conference is that the United States, at least during the Trump presidency, is no longer prepared to guarantee European security. Whether this is actually the case, or simply a tactic to motivate increased European defense spending, matters less than the fact that for the first time, the cohesion of the NATO alliance has been called into question.
Until now, NATO’s deterrent power has been based largely on the article of faith, or more precisely, Article 5 of the alliance’s charter, the “all for one and one for all” commitment to mutual defense. Americans should remember that Article 5 has been invoked only once in the alliance’s history, by the United States in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11. NATO members responded with unanimous support, and many member countries sent troops to fight alongside the United States in Afghanistan.
French President Emmanuel Macron responded to the U.S. comments last week by calling an emergency meeting of his European counterparts in Paris. While the impromptu summit failed to produce any major decisions, participants agreed on the need for the continent to take much greater responsibility for its own security. If U.S. President Donald Trump’s goal is to secure bigger defense budgets for Europe, his approach may work.
The recent change in tone across the Atlantic has certainly shaken many European leaders out of their complacency, but awareness of the need for Europe to move from a trading bloc to a military and geopolitical power has actually been growing for some time.
Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 annexation of Crimea shook up Eastern European and Nordic countries, but did not dissuade other European countries from increasing their dependence on Russian oil and gas. Only after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 did the European political establishment finally hear the alarm bells and start taking concrete action, at least in the economic sphere. However, despite the overall increase in European defense spending over the past three years, the continent remains heavily dependent on the United States for its security.
Of course, coming to terms with the new reality and doing something about it are two very different things. Europe now appears to recognize its own vulnerability to the threat posed by a revanchist and expansionist Russia, and to recognize the need to act in response to the apparent pivot of U.S. foreign policy away from Europe and toward Asia. But the questions raised by this insight are many.
Are Europeans really prepared to vote for increased defence budgets at the expense of the social safety nets on which so many people rely? Are European leaders prepared to consolidate their defence manufacturing industries and eliminate wasteful redundancies in weapons programmes by forming pan-European consortia? Indeed, would any new collective European defence strategy be structured around the EU, with its notoriously cumbersome decision-making processes, or would it be more effective to form some new grouping specifically for military matters? The answers to these questions will provide insight into Europe’s true commitment to self-defence.
Europe’s leaders are not the only ones who must answer difficult questions. American policymakers must also carefully consider the implications of a new European security strategy. The United States, Britain, Germany, and most of NATO’s new Eastern European members have long opposed calls for a more autonomous European defense capability. Their arguments typically are that a separate European command would undermine NATO’s guarantees, weaken existing military resources, and create an overburdened bureaucracy that would add nothing to the continent’s security. Many in Europe now believe that these arguments have been rendered meaningless by the new Trump administration.
How comfortable would the United States be with an independent European security policy? The United States typically calls the shots in NATO, and European armies tend to acquiesce in American standardization of weapons. Could European defense production pose a challenge to U.S. dominance? How would Washington respond if autonomous European militaries decided to act independently in a regional crisis, such as in 2020, when France sent warships to support Greece and Cyprus against Turkey over gas discoveries in the Aegean Sea?
The last major example of European powers acting independently of the United States was the Suez Crisis of 1956, which demonstrated the potential costs of weakening the transatlantic partnership. U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower demanded the withdrawal of Anglo-French troops from Egypt, leading to the humiliation and resignation of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden. While the Suez Crisis was ongoing, the Soviet Union invaded Hungary, crushing a popular uprising against the country’s Kremlin-installed communist leadership. A divided West did nothing to support the Hungarian freedom fighters.
Edward Verona is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center, focusing on Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe.
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