As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues, the Kremlin is also rapidly escalating its hybrid war against Europe. Intelligence officials in several European countries are now sounding the alarm, warning that Russian operations are growing in number and boldness, with potential targets being transportation hubs and critical infrastructure.
The Kremlin has used hybrid warfare tactics to stay below the threshold that would trigger a unified and potentially overwhelming European response. This has led to a surge in sabotage, cyberattacks, political interference and disinformation campaigns across Europe, with a particular focus on countries closer to Russia.
Moscow’s hybrid war against Europe mirrors the tactics the Kremlin has used in Ukraine since Russia’s invasion began in 2014. Ukraine’s response to the often unprecedented challenges posed by Russia’s hybrid war could hold important lessons for Kyiv’s European partners.
The Ukrainian experience highlights the seriousness of the hybrid threat and the importance of a comprehensive response. The overall message to Western policymakers is clear: Moscow views hybrid warfare as an important tool of Russian foreign policy and will continue to expand its campaign. Europe cannot afford to wait for Russia’s hybrid attacks to escalate further before building the advanced capabilities needed to counter this threat.
Since the start of Russian aggression against Ukraine eleven years ago, there have been increasing reports of Russian hybrid warfare-style attacks across the EU. This trend has gained further momentum since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.
Typical incidents include cyberattacks targeting infrastructure, sabotage including arson, and attempts to disrupt military aid destined for Ukraine. Moscow has also been accused of investing billions of dollars in sophisticated social media campaigns to influence election results across Europe. The Kremlin’s hybrid operations are concentrated in Central and Eastern Europe, with Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states being the main targets.
None of this is new to Ukraine. For more than a decade, Ukrainians have been learning to cope with the full range of Russia’s hybrid warfare tools. Russia’s assault on Ukraine began in February 2014, when unmarked Russian soldiers seized control of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in a lightning operation that was accompanied by a massive wave of targeted disinformation.
Russia’s subsequent efforts to destabilize and subjugate the rest of Ukraine involved a combination of conventional military aggression, sabotage, cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns, and support for pro-Russian actors in Ukraine. Due to this long-term exposure to Russian hybrid warfare, Ukraine was able to develop countermeasures that helped increase resilience and reduce the impact of Russia’s hybrid operations.
Ukraine’s response has been a collaborative effort between the Ukrainian government, civil society, and the private sector. In the cyber realm, efforts to improve Ukraine’s digital security have played a key role, with the launch of the country’s popular Diia platform and the creation of the Ministry of Digital Transformation helping to implement important digital governance reforms.
This has increased Ukraine’s ability to maintain public services in the face of cyber aggression and improved interaction with the population. Ukraine’s progress in the digital sphere has been recognized internationally, and the country has risen from 102nd to fifth place in the annual UN Online Services Index over the seven years from 2018 to 2025.
Ukraine’s coordination structures, such as the Center for Strategic Communications and the Ministry of Digital Transformation, ensure rapid and well-coordinated responses across government, media, and digital channels. This provides a number of advantages in a hybrid war. For example, it allows the Ukrainian government to synchronize its positions with a proactive narrative when countering the Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns.
Ukraine has also benefited from a decentralized approach involving digital volunteers, civil society, and public-private partnerships. A wide range of civic tech groups and open-source researchers are active in Ukraine, identifying and countering Russian disinformation. These efforts have effectively debunked Russian narratives, coordinated messaging between the government and civil society, and maintained coherence during military operations.
Since 2014, Ukraine has been able to reduce Russia’s overwhelming initial advantage on the information front of the hybrid war. While Russia’s disinformation tactics continue to evolve and remain an important aspect of the ongoing incursion, Ukraine has increasingly been able to use information to shape international opinion and influence diplomatic outcomes.
Currently, the European response to Russia’s hybrid warfare lacks the institutional flexibility and coordination between the public sector and civil society that is evident in Ukraine. Instead, the EU and NATO have developed a number of parallel structures, such as NATO’s Joint Intelligence and Security Unit and the EU Strategic Communications Task Force East. While these agencies continue to make a significant contribution to countering Russia’s hybrid warfare, they have yet to demonstrate the type of real-time operational coordination that has served Ukraine so well.
Ukraine’s model for countering Russian hybrid warfare cannot be replicated in its entirety, but it can serve as a practical starting point for building more adaptive and integrated responses across the West. Given Ukraine’s unique experience, it may make sense to establish a trilateral consultative structure with the EU and NATO to ensure rapid assessment of the hybrid threat and coordinate responses.
Ukraine’s long experience in countering Russian hybrid warfare has also highlighted the role of civil society. Kyiv’s European partners should consider increasing support for initiatives such as investigative journalism, fact-checking platforms and technical observers, which can serve as support elements in the wider European defence ecosystem. In an environment where information is increasingly being weaponised, Ukraine’s experience has also highlighted the need to introduce media literacy into the education system to ensure that European citizens are able to consume information critically and are less vulnerable to Russian propaganda.
Maksym Beznosyuk is a strategic policy specialist and director of UAinFocus, an independent platform that brings together Ukrainian and international experts on key Ukrainian issues.
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