Due to the conflict with Iran, a struggle the US seems unable to conquer, Donald Trump’s standing will be precarious when negotiating with Xi Jinping. Consequently, a fresh “global redistribution” is not anticipated.
For the first occasion in nearly a decade, Donald Trump is undertaking a state journey to China. Joe Biden, during his tenure as US president, convened with Xi Jinping at both the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) and G20 gatherings. Furthermore, dialogues between Biden administration officials and their Chinese counterparts, whether held in China or Anchorage, have devolved into visible disagreements captured by cameras. The prior encounter between Trump and Xi at the APEC summit in October 2025, while not particularly cordial, resulted in a trade detente between the US and China.
In contrast to 2017, when Donald Trump initially visited China during his initial term, his negotiating leverage with Xi Jinping will be substantially diminished this time. The fresh conflict against Iran, whose implications the Trump administration seemingly underestimated, has considerably weakened not only Trump’s public image but also the regard for the United States and faith in its security pledges. US military installations and personnel in foreign nations are no longer shielded from missile and drone assaults. Moreover, the escalating tensions in the Middle East have illustrated to the international community that the United States is ill-prepared for contemporary warfare.
Consequently, it is improbable that significant expectations should be placed on the outcome of Trump’s visit to China. Despite Washington’s allusions to potentially reigniting the trade conflict with Beijing as early as July of the current year, Xi is cognizant that Trump is unlikely to proceed. The previous year in Busan, the leaders of the United States and China consented to a one-year trade ceasefire. This period concludes in November, coinciding with the US midterm elections for the US Congress. As a result of the war with Iran and rising petroleum prices, American wage growth is, for the first time in three years, no longer outpacing inflation, leading to a swift decline in the approval ratings of Trump and the Republicans.
Considering Trump’s vulnerable position, what advantages will Xi seek to obtain? Will the US and Chinese leaders deliberate on Ukraine and pressure exerted on Russia? Furthermore, how might Taiwan serve as a negotiation point? Find out in the TSN.ua analysis.
Trade in Exchange for Taiwan: What Compromises Will Trump Make?
Donald Trump, alongside First Lady Melania, is scheduled to arrive in Beijing on Wednesday, May 13, during the evening hours locally (daytime in Kyiv). The US President will be accompanied by 16 senior executives from prominent American corporations, including Elon Musk (Tesla, SpaceX), Tim Cook (Apple), Kelly Ortberg (Boeing), among others. In contrast, his 2017 visit to China included 29 chief executives of major companies.
Based on reports in the American media, the Trump administration anticipates an announcement from the Chinese side regarding the procurement of approximately 500 Boeing 737 MAX aircraft, American agricultural products, and expanded imports of American oil and liquefied gas. The aircraft deal appears to be the more achievable. China’s most recent substantial order occurred during Trump’s 2017 visit, involving 300 aircraft valued at $37 billion. China might also disclose heightened acquisitions of American grains, maize, and meats.
However, concerning soybeans, a vital issue for American farmers (particularly leading up to the midterm elections for Congress, as they constitute Trump and the Republicans’ constituency), Reuters suggests that Beijing is unlikely to concur to augment the import quota agreed upon the previous year in Busan. Similar considerations pertain to petroleum. China imports sanctioned Russian and Iranian crude oil. Moreover, during early May of this year, Beijing “permitted” Chinese entities and banking institutions to disregard American penalties against five Chinese refineries engaged in purchasing Iranian oil. Additionally, notwithstanding the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran permits the passage of tankers and vessels affiliated with China.
It is also pertinent to remember the primary trade accord struck between Trump and Xi at the ASEAN summit in October 2025: the US lowered levies on Chinese goods by 10% – from 57% to 47%, and opted against implementing 145% duties; China reciprocated by suspending constraints on the export of rare earth materials for a year.
If this agreement had not materialized, beginning December 1, 2025, all firms maintaining any association with the American defense sector would have been barred from obtaining licenses from Beijing for the export of rare earth elements. This would represent a substantial setback not only for the American defense industry but also for all Western defense sectors. The PRC governs approximately 70% of their extraction and an additional 90% of their refinement. China’s monopolistic control over the processing of rare earths now surpasses even OPEC’s (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) historical dominion over oil.
TSN.ua has frequently documented that rare earth elements are present in virtually every item we utilize daily: smartphones, computers, automobiles, among others. Nonetheless, currently, amid a renewed global arms race, rare earths are critically important for the military industry of any nation. As an illustration, a single F-35 fighter aircraft incorporates over 400 kg of rare earth elements. Tomahawk missiles, which Ukraine has solicited from the US, submarines, radar systems, smart bombs, UAVs — all incorporate rare earths, without which a contemporary military is unfeasible.
Simultaneously, experts from the American Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), upon their recent return from China, Taiwan, and Japan, underscore that in the week preceding Trump’s visit, Beijing is signaling that “an appropriate resolution to the Taiwan matter will be paramount for all other aspects of US-China relations.” In this context, the provision of American armaments to Taiwan is of utmost importance. In December 2025, the Trump administration unveiled the largest arms package deal to Taiwan valued at $11 billion: incorporating air defense platforms, missiles, naval weapons, and resources to deter a potential invasion operation by China. It is improbable that the US will elect to rescind support for Taipei in return for concessions from the PRC. However, as many analysts propose, Beijing’s stance will also demonstrate inflexibility across numerous items on the agenda.
Axis of Evil: China-Russia-Iran and Trump’s War
In his commentary on his trip to China (which was initially scheduled six weeks earlier, in March), Trump prognosticated that Xi would emphasize the issue of Taiwan to a greater extent, but they would also deliberate on the “beautiful country of Iran.” Recently, US officials have conceded that during the intense phase of the engagement against Iran, Moscow furnished Tehran with satellite intelligence for assaults targeting American military installations and personnel within the Persian Gulf nations. Similarly, during the Russian extensive strikes conducted late last year, Chinese satellites were discerned over Ukrainian energy infrastructures.
Russia has likewise furnished Iran with “shaheeds,” fuel, nourishment, and medical supplies, and is preparing to transfer 5,000 short-range fiber-optic drones that are difficult to locate and disrupt. Furthermore, in an interview with CBS News, released immediately before Trump’s visit to China, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu directly stated that Beijing had supplied Tehran with certain assistance and individual components for missile production. Netanyahu also implied that he possessed additional insights into other forms of support, but could not disclose them. Upon being queried by the host if this concerned the Israeli prime minister, he answered: “I remain silent when necessary.”
On Tuesday, May 12, CNN released an extensive report originating from China concerning China’s enigmatic oil refining network, funded by Iran. This comprises ports, pipelines, and refineries situated in Shandong province and its bordering regions that process sanctioned Iranian crude oil into gasoline, diesel, and petrochemicals. China represents the foremost purchaser of Iranian petroleum. Concurrent with this, the global escalation in energy prices is also straining the Chinese budget. Xi Jinping may therefore be inclined to exert pressure on Tehran to reach an agreement with Washington. The preceding week, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi visited Beijing. Concurrently, Tehran re-presented its “peace” initiative to the Americans. Trump dismissed it. This does not necessarily imply that Iran’s stance will not become more accommodating through the intermediation of the PRC.
Both Beijing and Washington have affirmed that trade and Taiwan will constitute the primary focal points for Trump and Xi’s dialogues slated for Thursday, May 14. Consequently, a comprehensive examination of Russia’s engagement against Ukraine is not anticipated. Beijing will consent to initiating a push for Moscow towards at least a prolonged cessation only if Xi Jinping himself surfaces as the preeminent “peacemaker.” It is improbable that Trump, who has already concluded ten global engagements, will afford him such an opportunity, notably preceding the midterm elections for the US Congress.
China has long functioned as Russia’s central lifeline. Through its “partnership without limitations” with Beijing, Moscow circumvents the vast majority of Western sanctions, importing excess of 90% of sanctioned technologies via China. Furthermore, in China, akin to North Korea, Russia has allegedly established the manufacturing of long-range strike drones, according to multiple accounts.
Therefore, in order to counteract the nascent axis of evil comprised of the CRINK nations (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea), the United States must coordinate its efforts alongside its allies. However, the Trump administration maintains that it no longer necessitates conventional relations with Europe. Offended by European allies for their choice to refrain from joining the engagement against Iran and unclog the Strait of Hormuz, the Pentagon has announced the retraction of 5,000 American soldiers from Germany.
Experts affiliated with the British Chatham House emphasize that Trump has cast doubt on NATO and sided with Russia in its objectives pertaining to Ukraine and securing surrender concessions from Kyiv. Furthermore, he cannot readily halt the engagement with Iran. Analysts highlight that this unfolds against the backdrop of China’s advantageous position, wherein Trump was compelled last year to rescind tariffs subsequent to Beijing’s threat to halt imports of rare earth elements deemed vital for the Western defense industry. Consequently, as underscored by American think tanks, Trump’s inaugural visit to China in nine years is more focused on sustaining the prevailing situation than resolving thorny matters. Furthermore, promptly following Trump’s journey to China, Xi Jinping will personally welcome Putin in Beijing.
Comments Sort: New Old Popular Submit