Regarding the Franco-German proposal for a Serbia-Kosovo solution, which includes the acceptance of Kosovo’s independence, we must take into account the notion of Serbian superiority which has been cultivated since the beginning of the 19th century, writes Driton Tali.
Driton Tali was a member of the AKR Parliamentary Group in Kosovo’s Parliament at the time Kosovo declared independence in 2008 and was a political advisor for parliamentary Speaker Glauk Konjufca.
Serbia has been raising tensions in Kosovo’s northern municipalities for several days, most recently over the legal obligation of citizens of Kosovo to obtain vehicle plates with the RKS registration.
Many citizens of the Serbian community in the northern municipalities of Kosovo continue to hold registration plates of the former Yugoslavia under Serbia’s direction. Meanwhile, other citizens of the Serbian communities living in settlements all over Kosovo are using RKS registration plates with no issue.
This is the latest in a continued pattern of Serbia refusing to recognise Kosovo’s independence while trying to enforce its hegemony.
But it comes with increased radical views among Serbians in the nationalist media. They accuse and attack other nationalities, such as Croatians, Bosnians, and Montenegrins, not just Kosovo citizens. This rhetoric has even increased towards Macedonians and the Macedonian Orthodox Church.
This current situation is reminiscent of the late 1980s, when Slobodan Milosevic, with his propaganda apparatus, began the campaign against all non-Serbian people in the former Yugoslavia, resulting in the wars of the 90s.
Russia’s influence is also rife, and when combined with nationalism, we see a Serbian population that is 84% in favour of Putin’s Russia and 88% of them against NATO and the West.
The reality of these statistics is made clear when looking at the fact that there have also been mass protests in Belgrade and other Serbian cities in Putin’s support. Russian flags, banners with Putin’s face, and pro-Russian graffiti have become commonplace since the war started.
This can be considered a form of “hybrid warfare”, and there are concerns this is intensifying across the region.
There is also a strong feeling that Russia is trying to spread conflict in the Western Balkans, through Serbia, in the hope that it will relieve some of the international pressure it is currently facing. This also appears to have acted as a dog whistle for nationalist Serbs.
Today, Serbia is led by Alexander Vučić, who, worked as the Minister of Information in the Government of Milosevic, otherwise known as the “Hitler of the Balkans”, during the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. He has since refused to recognise war crimes and even genocides carried out during regimes he is a part of.
You also have the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ivica Dacic, known as “Little Sloba” in reference to Slobodan Milosevic, who was the leader of the SPS Youth (Milosevic’s party) and then the chief of propaganda of the SPS party.
Hence, it is unwise to expect Vucic to willingly accept any agreement that officially recognises Kosovo’s sovereignty. This is due to Vucic’s and Dacic’s political past, which allowed them to building their political careers, and the political and social environment in today’s Serbia.
For them to be swayed into accepting such a deal, there would need to be extensive international effort and pressure. The EU is currently dangling the carrot of EU accession and more funds in the hopes of bringing Belgrade on side – both in terms of Kosovo and its loyalty to Russia, but attempts have so far been fruitless.
Polls from 2022 show that for the first time, a majority of Serbians are against EU membership, with just 35% in favour. Add this to the increasing anti-Western sentiments and a long-running grudge against NATO, and the idea of bringing them into the fold or seeing them agree to concessions under the guidance of the bloc, France and Germany seem unlikely to materialise.
Source: euractiv.com
