The case of Poland demonstrates how a country can defeat populism. However, such victories are not inevitable and can be reversed, writes Marcin Zaborowski.
Marcin Zaborowski is policy director at the Future of Security Programme of GLOBSEC.
After eight years of ruling Poland, the right-wing populist Law and Justice party is set to lose power, although it scored the highest result in the election on 15 October.
The party won 35% of votes, translating into 194 seats in the 460-member parliament, which – short of coup d’état – essentially means that a broad coalition of pro-democracy forces will govern Poland.
This is the first time in Europe’s modern history that populists are defeated in a democratic, though a very unfair contest, with Law and Justice being pumped up by the state-owned media and massively financed by state-owned companies.
The two most recent attempts to defeat populists in power in Hungary and Turkey failed. Moreover, the populist coalition won the election in Italy, the populists are growing in strength in France, Germany and the United States. It is no longer impossible to imagine that democracy and the rule of law are under assault, weakened and even abandoned throughout the Western world.
But even though liberal democracy is under pressure and the anti-establishment appeal of populists resonates with many voters, the case of Poland demonstrates that their victory is not inevitable and can be reversed.
What are the key lessons that other nations can draw from the Polish example?
Each case is different, and national conditions vary between Poland on the one hand and Hungary and Turkey – where populists prevailed – on the other. The Western European populisms are still more different because democratic institutions had more time to mature there.
However, some lessons from Poland are universal for the rest of the democratically-minded Europeans to consider.
More specifically, the democrats won in Poland for three fundamental reasons: attractiveness of their offer, mass mobilisation and civic courage.
In the case of Hungary and Turkey, the opposition ran together, offering a united front against populists in power. There was hope that a united front stretching from socialists to conservatives would be more attractive to the voters. This tactic misfired in both cases.
The state-owned media successfully portrayed the opposition blocks as motley groups of frustrated and the parties of government – AKP in Turkey and Fidesz in Hungary – as reliable and coherent defenders of national values. The confused voters hesitated to support blocks that included parties radically inconsistent with their values.
One can imagine a Hungarian socialist being disgusted to vote for a block including far-right Jobbik and vice versa.
Poland avoided this trap by having three opposition parties running separately. The voters had a clear choice. They knew the parties would cooperate, but they had a choice of voting for an option consistent with their worldviews. This method also had several tactical advantages. The state-owned media focused their fire on Tusk.
They did so excessively that even the pro-government voters became critical, and some turned away. In effect, much less fire was left to attack other opposition parties.
Importantly, those who did not want to vote for Tusk but had enough of Law and Justice now had alternatives: a more conservative Third Way or a more progressive New Left.
There was a mass mobilisation ahead of the election. In June, three months before the election was due, the opposition parties called in for a pro-democracy demonstration in Warsaw to celebrate the anniversary of Poland’s first semi-free elections in 1989.
The demonstration was a stumping success, with turnout reaching half a million demonstrators. People came from all over the country, bringing their friends and families. The momentum was visibly growing. Encouraged by this success, Tusk called in another demonstration two weeks before the election.
The turnout was even greater this time, with nearly a million flooding Warsaw’s streets. The effect was a massively improved turnout for the election day. 74% of the electorate voted, historically the highest number in Poland’s democratic history, 14 points higher than during the previous election in 2019.
Moreover, two groups that made up for much of the improved turnout were women and first-time voters, both voting in greater numbers for the pro-democracy parties.
Finally, the democratic opposition leaders demonstrated civil courage and worked extremely hard while campaigning.
Tusk travelled for months across the country in his famous Tusk bus, reaching most remote parts of the country and speaking at open events in areas often openly hostile to him. The same was true for the leaders of the centrist Third Way, Szymon Holownia and Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz, who prioritised small towns and the countryside.
Both Tusk and Holownia, as well as the Left’s representative, accepted the invitation to the so-called televised ‘debate’ on the state-owned TVP. The debate was totally biased and moderated by staunch Law and Justice loyalists but backfired on the government’s party.
The moderators again focused on directing fire on Donald Tusk, but the representing Law and Justice Prime Minister Morawiecki underperformed. Most importantly, Szymon Holownia of the Third Way was a clear winner.
The debate, held on the week of the election, was probably one of the main factors that catapulted the first time running Third Way to 14.4% at the ballot box, securing the majority for the pro-democracy parties.
The case of Poland, where populists have complete control of state-owned media and have governed for eight years to complete the capture of state institutions, demonstrates that there is nothing inevitable about the advancement of populism.
Naturally, there is no doubt that populism remains a formidable ideology and, when organised, a formidable force. The case of Poland proves this, too. After all, 35% of Poles still voted for Law and Justice, and 7% voted for the far-right Confederation. For now, the democratic forces have prevailed, but their advantage is narrow.
In this election, the first-time voters and women made the difference and delivered the majority to the pro-democratic forces.
Mobilising these groups seems a key to the future success of liberal democracy.
Source: euractiv.com
