The lack of a legal underpinning for the ‘Spitzenkandidaten process’ allowed the European Council in 2019 to ignore the successful 2014 precedent. The next European Parliament election in June might possibly be able to mend this shortcoming, writes Dick Roche.
Dick Roche is a former minister for European Affairs of Ireland .
With the European elections just months away and speculation mounting as to whether Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will seek a second term the ‘Spitzenkandidaten process’ is back in the news.
Under the Spitzenkandidaten process, the European political groups decide, ahead of the European elections, on the candidate that they support to lead the European Commission. The candidates become the ‘face’ of the political groups in the elections.
Advocates of the process argue it provides greater democratic legitimacy to the selection of the Commission President, makes the appointment process transparent, less of a backroom deal, and, generally, makes the process more comprehensible to voters.
They suggest, based on an uptick in turnout in the 2019 EU Parliament elections, that the process promotes voter participation and see it as a step towards the creation of a European demos.
Why the Process Failed in 2019
The Spitzenkandidaten process, which has no status in the EU Treaties, was first used in 2014. The selection of Jean-Claude Junker as the lead candidate of the largest political group (the European People’s Party) in 2014 to head up the Commission was perceived as a success for the process.
However, in 2019, Manfred Weber, the lead candidate of the EPP, was ‘passed over’. Heads of state and government nominated Ursula von der Leyen (also from EPP) who was subsequently elected by the Parliament in a secret ballot with 383 votes in favour, 327 against and 22 abstaining.
It is the lack of a legal underpinning for the process which allowed the Council to ignore the 2014 precedent.
The Treaty on European Union, Article 17.7 provides that the Council, “taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and having held the appropriate consultations”, on a qualified majority, proposes its candidate for Commission president to the Parliament for ratification.
The wording of the Article which has been described as “under-determined,” is not a piece of sloppy drafting, rather it is intentional, aimed unambiguously at leaving the nominee for Commission President firmly in the Council’s remit.
That reality was demonstrated during an informal European Council meeting held in February 2018.
The process of nominating the candidate for appointment to the position of Commission President and the question of transnational candidates – issues referred to by the then Council President Donald Tusk as “Brussels bubble topics” – were discussed by the Council.
Reporting on the meeting, Tusk indicated that it was “not possible” for a European Council to guarantee in advance that it would propose the lead candidate put forward by a political group for President of the Commission. There is, Tusk said, “no automaticity” in this process.
The lack of Council support for the Spitzenkandidaten process was no surprise. President Emmanuel Macron’s party labelled the process a ‘democratic anomaly.’ Leaders from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Slovakia also voiced their opposition.
The other factors that conspired against Weber
In addition to the lack of a legal underpinning for the Spitzenkandidaten process, a series of factors allowed the Council to ignore Weber’s candidacy.
The unity in the Parliament that existed in 2014 was not present in 2019. When the presidents of the political groups met shortly after the May 2019 European election, they made no endorsement of Weber’s candidacy for the Commission presidency, a departure from the position taken on Juncker by their counterparts in 2014.
The question of Weber’s experience was also raised. Weber had gone from Bavaria’s Landtag to the EU Parliament. He had no experience at national government level: a fact that was well known when he was nominated.
Opponents also charged that Weber’s party was too close to Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party. Weber was portrayed as shielding Orbán – a factor in Macron’s opposition to him becoming Commission president. Ironically, following a controversy about the Fidesz EU Parliament election campaign, Orbán announced he would not vote for Weber.
Weber also suffered because of the EPP’s opposition to transnational candidates.
The problems that beset Weber’s efforts had a knock-on effect on the other lead candidates. When Weber’s name did not go forward, the door closed for the other lead candidates as well. This is how ‘outsider’ Ursula von der Leyen was nominated.
Spitzenkandidaten ‘Lite’
While von der Leyen has not formally confirmed that she will seek a second term as Commission president, the general expectation is that she will do so, bringing questions about the Spitzenkandidaten process back into the spotlight.
For months the speculation has been that von der Leyen would seek to run in the 2024 EU elections as the CDU lead candidate in the Lower Saxony and become the EPP Spitzenkandidate.
But this scenario would not be without problems. First, the widely respected MEP David McAlister would be ‘bumped’ into second place on the CDU list. Second and more problematic, von der Leyen would probably be elected with a lower number of votes than Weber, the CSU lead candidate in Bavaria.
On the day von der Leyen delivered her 2023 State of the Union speech last September, the German news outlet Rundblick Niedersachsen reported that she would not run in the election, but she would still be the EPP Spitzenkandidat.
How this workaround is to be achieved was not explained. In any case, stacking the decks in favour of von der Leyen is likely to refuel cynicism about backroom deals and privilege – not a ‘good look’.
For over two decades, a considerable amount of effort has been invested in the creation of an open transparent and democratic system for appointing the Commission President.
The Convention on the Future of the European Union, which in 2003 unsuccessfully looked at alternatives, eventually settled for the formula of words that in time found their way into Article 17.7 of the Treaty on European Union.
The only way to resolve the weakness in the current system is to amend Article 17.7 of TUE and to put in its place wording that delivers an open, transparent, and democratic process.
The ball will be in the court of the new Parliament elected in June. When it comes to the election of the next Commission president, the new Parliament could make it clear that it will only consider candidates who bring with them copper-fastened commitments to amend Article 17.7.
Source: euractiv.com
