February 2025 became a moment of truth for Ukraine-US relations. Instead of the expected reboot, Kyiv received a series of cold showers — from the Trump administration’s contradictory statements to the failed meeting at the White House. Washington is talking less and less about Ukraine’s victory and more and more about compromises with Moscow. Is Kyiv ready to play by the new rules, and what will be the consequences of this change of course? Mykola Beleskov, senior analyst at the Center for Initiatives “Return Alive,” tells us.
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The election of Donald Trump as the 47th President of the United States has become one of the key factors that will influence the course of the war between Ukraine and Russia in 2025 and possible scenarios for its conclusion.
However, both before his inauguration and for some time after it, assessments of this impact remained speculative due to the lack of specific statements and decisions from the new administration.
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However, February 2025 will go down in history as the moment when the position of Trump and his team began to take on a clearer shape. The reaction to their statements and actions, ranging from shock to irritation and anger, gives reason to call this period “the month of disillusionment.”
But let's talk about everything in turn.
The domestic agenda in the US and its impact on foreign policy
To understand what Ukraine heard and saw from the Donald Trump administration in February 2025, it is worth, paradoxically as it may sound, starting with US domestic politics.
Recently, disturbing trends have been developing in the country that call into question the future of liberal democracy.
Under the pretext of a “mandate for radical change,” the following is happening.
- Attacks on the civil service led by Elon Musk. In particular, the de facto elimination of USAID, the reduction of bureaucracy through mass “vacations” and the appointment of officials based on loyalty rather than professionalism.
- Pressure on the judiciary, which is accused of not reflecting the “will of the people,” which, according to the Trump administration's logic, should deprive it of the right to block government decisions.
- Restricting disloyal media access to the government. Special envoy Richard Grenell has openly stated that US government-funded media, including Voice of America, must defend government policy.
- Controversial appointments: Key positions are filled by people whose qualifications and previous statements raise questions. For example, Pete Hegseth, Tulsi Gabbard, Kash Patel.
All this, together with the lack of investigations into Russian interference in the US elections and possible ties between Donald Trump's team and the Kremlin, as was the case in 2017–2019, gives the 47th president the opportunity to ignore traditional approaches to US foreign policy, formed after World War II.
And this, in turn, has negative consequences for Ukraine.
US Vice President J.D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference in February 2025. Photo by Getty Images
Hegset and Vance in Europe. The first shock
The first clear signals about the new administration's vision for Europe's role in US foreign policy and the resolution of the war between Ukraine and Russia were heard during the visits to Europe by US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth (February 11–14) and Vice President James David Vance (February 11–15).
At a meeting of the Contact Group on Defense Issues in Ukraine (“Ramstein format”), which was for the first time chaired by the United Kingdom, not the United States, Hegseth made a number of controversial statements.
- Returning Ukraine to its 2014 borders is an unrealistic goal.
- Ukraine's membership in NATO is not a realistic outcome of the settlement.
- Security guarantees for Ukraine should be provided by European countries by deploying their troops, but without the protection of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty establishing NATO.
These statements can be interpreted as a signal to the Kremlin about its readiness for compromise, but many saw them as a unilateral concession without any steps towards it from Russia, which did not abandon its maximalist demands.
From Ukraine’s perspective, emphasizing the “unrealistic” nature of returning territories in the midst of strategic defense may create a false sense of what is actually standing in the way of peace. The problem is not Ukraine’s desire to restore territorial integrity, but Putin’s unwillingness to end the war.
There is also a significant difference between maintaining the right to join NATO (even if it is difficult in the short term) and abandoning this course under pressure. The latter option is precisely what the Kremlin wants.
Vice President J.D. Vance shocked the Munich Security Conference by saying that the key threats to Europe come not from Russia or China but from within. He said national elites and the EU bureaucracy were ignoring the will of their citizens, who were demanding radical change.
It is significant that the corresponding statement took place on the eve of the Bundestag elections in Germany, where Elon Musk actively supported the right-wing radical Alternative for Germany.
Vance's statement was a blow to transatlantic unity, which is critical to countering Russia and supporting Ukraine.
Top US and Russian diplomats meet at Diriyah Palace in Riyadh, February 18, 2025. They held talks on resetting relations between the countries and preliminarily starting attempts to end the war in Ukraine. Photo by Getty Images
Negotiations in Riyadh, attacks on Zelensky, and vote at the UN: second shock
In parallel with his subordinates' tour of Europe, on February 13, 2025, Donald Trump held a 90-minute telephone conversation with Vladimir Putin, effectively lifting the informal moratorium on contacts between the leaders of the United States and Russia, which had been in effect since February 24, 2022. European allies and Ukraine learned about the conversation only after the fact, although such contacts are usually coordinated with partners.
On February 18, high-level talks between representatives of the United States and Russia took place in Riyadh. It was formally announced that a group of experts would be created to discuss the terms of the settlement. At the same time, the positions of the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the occupied territories, NATO, and the Ukrainian army remain incompatible, making the search for a compromise almost impossible.
Russia is promoting a settlement scenario in the following sequence: ceasefire, elections, final agreements. This creates the risk of using democratic procedures to destabilize Ukraine.
In parallel, statements began to be heard in the United States questioning the legitimacy of Volodymyr Zelensky. Representatives of the Trump team supported this rhetoric, which gave rise to speculation that the White House viewed Zelensky as an obstacle to a “settlement” because he insisted on protecting Ukraine’s sovereignty and security. As a result, the Russian Federation and the United States simultaneously began attacking Zelensky regarding his legitimacy.
Against this backdrop, the US has refused to call Russia an aggressor in statements at the G7 and the UN General Assembly. The G7 failed to adopt a joint statement on the anniversary of the full-scale invasion, and at the UN, the US voted against the Ukrainian resolution for the first time, proposing a more neutral option.
These steps are seen by many as a shift in Washington's stance from supporting Ukraine to acting as a mediator between Kyiv and Moscow. Subsequent statements by Trump and his team have only confirmed this course.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant during the latter's visit to Kyiv, February 2025. Photo by Getty Images
Ukrainian subsoil in exchange for support
While representatives of the Trump administration were visiting Europe and contacting the Russians, another dramatic story unfolded in the United States — negotiations over access to Ukrainian natural resources.
On February 3, 2025, Trump announced U.S. interest in a minerals deal in exchange for further military aid. On February 7, Zelensky expressed openness to the idea, but stressed that the resources needed protection, and therefore security guarantees were needed. It was also about a mutually beneficial partnership, not just the transfer of Ukrainian resources to the United States.
The idea of joint mineral development appeared back in September 2024 in the Ukrainian “Victory Plan”, which provided for security guarantees along with economic cooperation.
On February 10, Trump made it clear that he considered the agreement to be compensation for “US aid to Ukraine” in 2022–2024, announcing the amount of $500 billion. However, the real figures are significantly different.
- Total direct US aid amounted to $106 billion.
- $70 billion went to finance the American defense industry, meaning it did not leave the territory of the United States.
- Only $33.3 billion was allocated for macroeconomic assistance to Ukraine, and $2.8 billion for humanitarian projects.
Differences in the interpretation of aid became the basis for further conflict.
On February 12, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessant arrived in Kyiv with a draft agreement, expecting its immediate signing. Washington hinted that if it was rejected, Zelensky's meeting with US Vice President J.D. Vance and the Secretary of State in Munich on February 14 could be canceled.
Ukraine's reluctance to unconditionally accept the US terms irritated Trump and his team. Kyiv had reasonable reservations, both about the amount of the deal and the lack of real security guarantees.
After two weeks of difficult negotiations, amid harsh rhetoric from the White House, the parties agreed to sign a memorandum of intent and consider creating a “Reconstruction Investment Fund.” Final approval of the details was postponed, and the agreement was planned to be signed during Zelensky’s visit to Washington on February 28.
Kyiv likely viewed the visit as a way to balance US-Russian contacts in Riyadh, where Ukraine was not present. This may explain why the head of the Ukrainian President’s Office, Andriy Yermak, supported the trip, while US special envoy Keith Kellogg advised against it.
On February 19–20, during a visit to Kyiv, Kellogg even asked not to hold a joint press conference, fearing that publicity would only emphasize the differences between the US and Ukraine and create a negative backdrop for the negotiations.
Tesla and SpaceX CEO Elon Musk and US President Donald Trump in the Oval Office of the White House, February 11, 2025. Photo by Getty Images
The rhetoric of Trump and his entourage: what is the danger?
Throughout February 2025, Donald Trump and his team made a series of statements regarding the causes of the Russian-Ukrainian war and possible scenarios for its resolution. Among them, three key narratives are particularly dangerous.
“Ukraine is to blame for the war.” Trump and his allies are hinting that the expansion of full-scale aggression on February 24, 2022, could have been avoided if Kyiv had made concessions to the Kremlin. At the same time, Russia, both then and now, is demanding Ukraine’s surrender — including withdrawal from NATO, neutrality, and reduction of the army.
“NATO provoked Russia.” No less dangerous are the claims that NATO expansion and the prospect of Ukraine’s membership explain Russia’s attack. Particular attention was drawn to the words of the US special envoy, Stephen Witkoff, who is in dialogue with Moscow, that the Istanbul Agreements could become the basis for peace. But, as is known, these agreements provided for Ukraine’s rejection of NATO, neutrality, and limitations on the army — in fact, the loss of sovereignty.
“Peace at any cost.” Another dangerous narrative is the need to stop the bloodshed as soon as possible, regardless of the conditions. Phrases like “Don’t you want peace that will save lives?” have long been used by Russian propaganda. They try to portray Ukraine as a party that “desires war,” ignoring the fact that without security guarantees, any ceasefire will only postpone a new stage of aggression. This is what happened with the Minsk agreements, which did not prevent Russia from attacking in 2022.
Recently, Elon Musk has been particularly active in promoting this narrative.
If the US administration's rhetoric increasingly coincides with Russian views on the causes and “outcome” of the war, then Washington may begin to act in a direction that is beneficial to Moscow.
US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky meet in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, D.C., February 28, 2025. Photo by Getty Images
Controversy in the Oval Office
February 28, 2025, was supposed to be the day when Ukraine and the United States would end their disputes through an agreement on joint use of subsoil resources. But things didn't go according to plan – a scuffle in the Oval Office thwarted the agreements.
The agreement was not signed. Zelensky was asked to leave the White House early, even without the traditional lunch with the US president.
In Ukraine, people are arguing about who is more to blame for the raised voices. But the main problem is deeper: the interests of the parties are radically different.
The Trump administration is eager to end the fighting as soon as possible to present it as a major diplomatic achievement for the United States. Washington is willing to sacrifice Ukraine’s interests—its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity—for a deal that can be sold as a victory for American diplomacy.
Ukraine does not want to repeat the mistakes of the past, when the US tried to improve relations with Russia at the expense of Ukrainian interests. That is why Zelensky does not give in on issues of sovereignty and security, which irritates Trump and his team.
Thus, the events of February 28 became the expected confirmation that the positions of Ukraine and the United States do not coincide. It is difficult to build constructive relations when Kyiv's key arguments simply do not find a response in Washington.
Now there is a real risk that Trump will use the Oval Office skirmish as an excuse to cut aid to Ukraine, accusing Kyiv of a lack of respect. Although it was clear even before that: the new US administration is skeptical about supporting Ukraine at the level of 2022-2024.
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer meets with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at Downing Street in London on March 1, 2025. Photo by Getty Images
What do we have in the end?
In February 2025, Ukraine quickly moved from “Plan A” to “Plan B” in its interaction with Donald Trump. That is, from attempts at dialogue and finding compromises to a hard landing and developing an alternative strategy with support from Europe.
How to proceed on the American front is currently an open question. Key indicators of future relations include the level of contacts between the countries, the fate of the minerals deal, and security support.
Meanwhile, Trump and his team are playing “good cop, bad cop.” The US president is leaving room for dialogue, trying to present the subsoil agreement as a de facto security guarantee. At the same time, his associates are increasing pressure on Zelensky, demanding a public apology, resignation, and elections in Ukraine.
All of this forms an unpleasant “Faustian bargain”: in order to maintain at least minimal US support, Ukraine must concede fundamental issues of sovereignty and security, putting its own future at risk.
Not the best choice…
