Europe’s newest forum will need momentum to bring concrete results for member states, with several possible scenarios for its future, writes Sir Michael Leigh.
Sir Michael Leigh, former EU official in charge of EU enlargement, teaches at Johns Hopkins University (SAIS) in Bologna. A longer version of this article appeared in the GIS website.
With the European Political Community, a new intergovernmental grouping of 44 countries joined the continent’s crowded diplomatic scene in October in a show of solidarity after Russia invaded Ukraine.
Its name, suggested by French President Emmanuel Macron, evokes the early days of the European Union. But will it be a step toward EU membership for Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and the Western Balkans? A framework for dialogue with the United Kingdom and other external states?
President Macron has argued that the EU needs a new way to engage with other European states besides its faltering Neighborhood Policy and enlargement process. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has insisted that the EU must streamline its decision-making before expanding; otherwise, a body with up to 36 members would be dysfunctional.
The yearlong “Conference on the Future of Europe,” sponsored by France, failed to devise solutions. Macron’s proposed constitutional convention to rewrite the EU’s founding treaties did not materialise, with Europe gripped by war, supply shocks and inflation.
Instead adapting an earlier French model, Macron presented the EPC as a new structure, embracing all European countries except Russia and Belarus. This would deliver a message of unity, he claimed, against a backdrop of Russian aggression and a precarious American commitment to European security.
For EU candidates, it would be a bridge to membership; for other European states, it would reinforce diplomatic, political, and economic ties. The UK’s (initially hesitant) participation would be a significant first step toward post-Brexit cooperation. Macron expected the EPC to offer not only dialogue but also projects with tangible benefits in areas like security and energy.
The EPC’s inaugural summit, organised by the Czech EU Council presidency, met in Prague on 6 October, with 44 countries attending. These included 27 EU members, 10 EU candidates and potential candidates (including Turkey), three European Economic Area states (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway), Switzerland, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the UK. The EU Commission and Council presidents were also present, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressed the summit from Kyiv.
Roundtables focused on peace and security, climate change and energy, migration and the economy. The Prague summit’s pragmatic approach was widely welcomed. Further meetings were scheduled for spring 2023 in Moldova and later in Spain and the UK. The absence of preconditions or pressure to agree on “common principles” was reassuring for some national leaders. But this flexibility raised questions about the EPC’s actual value compared to the Council of Europe, which has a nearly identical membership. Can it achieve concrete results with such diverse participation and a bare-bones structure?
Lean institution
By design, the EPC has no secretariat, financial resources or staff. EPC summit and roundtable agendas will be set by a host country that alternates between EU and non-EU members. The European Commission seems the apparent body to provide continuity between summit meetings. This might seem natural, as the 27 EU members form most of the EPC, and the EU’s top two officials participate in its meetings.
But the Prague session moved away from this model, with important roles emerging for the UK and other countries not interested in EU membership. The Czech Republic even suggested that Israel be invited, which was not taken up.
Club of democracies?
In a May speech launching the EPC in Strasbourg, Macron called for bringing together “democratic European nations that subscribe to our shared core values.” Yet the European Neighborhood Policy has demonstrated the futility of a box-ticking exercise that expects countries to sign up to values they do not uphold in practice. This often leads to accusations of bad faith. Several EPC participants in the southern Caucasus, eastern Europe and the Balkans – including Turkey and, indeed, EU members themselves – do not live up to supposed European standards. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Hungary, Serbia and Turkey maintain close links with Russia.
Risks and uncertainties
The chief risk associated with the EPC is that it becomes a talking shop with no tangible results. Secondly, the EPC may be seen in eastern Europe as a diversion from EU membership, not as a stepping stone. This would remove incentives to participate in the new forum actively and could weaken trust.
Finally, the EPC may be perceived in the Kremlin as a way of taunting Russian President Vladimir Putin – especially given the involvement of countries viewed by Moscow as within its sphere of influence. Ahead of the Prague summit, French representatives denied that the EPC was an anti-Russian initiative.
Faced with such uncertainties, the EPC may evolve along different paths:
Photo opportunity
Under this scenario, Europe’s urgent security and economic challenges lose the summit’s initial momentum. Participation at future gatherings is half-hearted and increasingly with appearances by ministers and senior officials instead of heads of government. Roundtable and plenary discussions become desultory. No working groups convene between summits, and sherpas meet rarely. Gradually, they become less frequent.
The European Commission is discouraged from putting forward joint projects, but no other entity emerges to take on these tasks. Eventually, some minor environmental and tourism projects are identified to be loosely coordinated by national ministries.
An insistence by several EU countries on respecting European values and aligning with the EU’s foreign policy alienates several participants; Moscow offers them incentives to withdraw.
Fledgling forum
Under this scenario, the EPC becomes widely accepted as the only regular top-level, Europe-wide forum with all members on a common footing. In its first two years, the EPC holds four summits and develops a lean governance structure, including an independent secretariat, well-defined areas of cooperation, and a budget contributed proportionately by its members.
It meets twice yearly at the summit level under a rotating presidency, alternating between EU and non-EU hosts, and sets up working groups in agreed priority areas. These generate collective security, energy, climate, infrastructure and migration projects. Projects are coordinated by national ministries.
Shared assessments of threats to European security are made. The EPC helps mobilise and coordinate support for the postwar reconstruction of Ukraine. It provides a setting where the UK and other countries not aspiring to EU membership can engage with EU partners. Britain hosts the fourth summit meeting, branded as the UK-European Cooperation Forum.
If France and Germany, still indispensable agents of change in Europe, resume their usual cooperation and find a common interest in maintaining the EPC, this initiative would have a future as the only top-level, pan-European forum for regular dialogue.
Source: euractiv.com
