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Ilya Neskhodovsky,
Recently, the European Union presented another package of sanctions against the aggressor, which, according to the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, is a real pressure on the aggressor. However, if we analyze its content, instead of pressure that should stop the aggressor, the 19th package looks like a package of disappointment. Although the steps envisaged by the package are certainly progress, they do not correspond to the determination that is needed to defeat the aggressor.
Russia is not waging a “small-scale” war; it attacks daily, using drones and violating airspace. Why is the West responding so timidly, risking that these measures may turn out to be just another imitation, not a decisive blow? Unfortunately, the 19th package continues the strategy of gradual pressure, which, as has been proven since 2014, has failed to prevent a full-scale invasion.
The sanctions imposed after the annexation of Crimea, while resulting in losses of 1.4% of real consumption in Russia, fell short of their full potential. If a full trade blockade had been imposed at the time, Russia’s losses could have increased tenfold, to 15% of GDP. This historical lesson proves that a slow, piecemeal approach only gave the Kremlin time to adapt and prepare for further aggression.
This indecision is particularly noticeable in the energy sector, which remains critical to the Russian budget, providing about 30% of its revenues. Russia’s federal budget revenues from oil and gas sales increased by more than 26% in 2024, reaching 11.13 trillion rubles. And while Europe has made significant progress, reducing imports of Russian pipeline gas by 77% from 2021 to 2024, it has also become the largest consumer of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG). This is a paradoxical situation that turns European countries into the largest sponsors of Russia’s war. According to the analytical company Kpler, in 2024 European countries purchased 52% of all Russian LNG exports, amounting to about 17.4 million tons. The key consumers were France (6.3 million tons), Spain (4.8 million) and Belgium (4.4 million tons).
Although the new package includes a complete ban on LNG imports, postponing the ban until January 1, 2027, even a year earlier than planned, is not just weakness, it is criminal indecision, giving Russia enough time to adapt. Rather than deal an immediate economic blow, the EU is allowing the Kremlin to preserve a super-profitable market and seek new ways to circumvent it. Russia is already actively reorienting its export flows, and by 2024, 63% of its crude oil exports were redirected to Asia and Oceania, compared to 34% in 2021. In addition, Russia is using this transition period to build new infrastructure, including in the Arctic, and actively seek new markets in Asia.
The political compromises required to achieve unanimous support from all 27 EU member states allow key importers like France, Spain, and Belgium to adapt their energy infrastructure and find alternative sources of supply. Even as the EU aggressively ramps up LNG imports from the US, this piecemeal approach undermines the overall effectiveness of the sanctions and continues to fund the war.
In addition, it is necessary to hit Russia’s “shadow fleet”, which transports oil around the price ceiling. This secret network, which has been estimated to number between 940 and 1,400 vessels, was created to evade sanctions. It is not enough to simply add vessels to the lists, as was done in the 19th package (118 vessels were added, bringing the total to over 560), as Russia continues to expand its fleet. This turns the sanctions process into a “game of chance” where the effectiveness against individual tankers is low.
According to research, 56 sanctioned tankers continued their operations, transporting 20 million tons of Russian oil. Secondary sanctions should be imposed on the ports that service them and the insurance companies that cover them. The analysis shows that 57% of the Russian oil transported by sanctioned vessels was delivered to just five key ports in India (Sikka, Vadinar, Mundra) and China (Lanjiao, Dongjiakou).
While most EU countries have reduced their imports of Russian oil, some remain key consumers. In particular, Hungary and Slovakia, which receive Russian pipeline oil via the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline, are exempt from EU-wide sanctions.
Hungary paid Russia €416 million for fossil fuels in August 2025, of which €176 million was for crude oil. Slovakia imported €276 million in oil and gas during the same period, with 74% of this amount (€204 million) being oil supplied through the Druzhba pipeline.
These countries, despite the existing technical possibility to diversify supplies, are politically resisting, citing higher costs and concerns about security of supply. This indicates the need to increase pressure on these states to end their dependence on the aggressor's energy resources. At the same time, it is worth noting that the Czech Republic completely abandoned Russian oil in April 2025, switching to supplies only from Western routes. This example shows that a full transition is possible. Ukraine stopped the transit of Russian gas from January 1, 2025 through its territory, but still, contrary to national interests, continues to transit Russian oil through the Druzhba oil pipeline.
Financial isolation should be complete. Initially, only seven Russian banks were excluded from the SWIFT system, which allowed giants like Gazprombank to remain in the system to ensure payments for gas and oil. No exceptions. This, together with restrictions on cryptocurrency platforms that Russia uses to circumvent sanctions, would allow international payments to be paralyzed.
For example, the Russian crypto exchange Garantex continues to operate despite being blacklisted by the US because its servers are located outside of US jurisdiction. Adding dual-use companies and technologies to the sanctions lists is a step in the right direction, but these measures should be accompanied by tough secondary sanctions against any countries that aid the Russian military-industrial complex.
Thus, exports of electronic components from the United Arab Emirates to Russia increased more than sevenfold in 2022, reaching almost $283 million. Russia is successfully manipulating the desire of third countries to avoid harsh secondary sanctions from the West, while at the same time benefiting from cooperation.
The 19th sanctions package is a step in the right direction, especially in terms of restrictions on LNG, cryptocurrencies, and dual-use technologies. But it continues to suffer from fragmentation and strategic gaps. While the West acts gradually, the Kremlin has time to adapt and find new ways around it.
These findings are consistent with the analysis outlined in a recent analytical paper by the ANTS National Interests Protection Network, “A Strategy for Victory through Increased Sanctions Pressure on Russia,” which proposes a set of seven key measures to achieve Russia’s complete economic isolation.
These proposals include the complete disconnection of all Russian and Belarusian banks from SWIFT, the introduction of secondary sanctions against ports serving the “shadow fleet” as well as against insurance companies that cover them. The document calls for a complete embargo on Russian LNG, without any transitional periods, and the systematic destruction of “parallel import” channels by introducing tough secondary sanctions against intermediary countries.
Additionally, it is proposed to confiscate frozen sovereign assets to finance Ukraine's recovery and aggressively lower the price ceiling on oil to a level below the cost of production.
A real victory in this economic war requires maximum political will and a coordinated simultaneous strike on all financial, energy, and logistical arteries of the Russian regime. The West must move from a strategy of containment to a strategy of decisive economic defeat.
