© Allexxandar/depositphotos.com Europe endeavors to diminish its reliance on the US for protection.
In 21 weeks, European heads of state will converge at the NATO assembly in Ankara. The majority have yet to exhibit considerable advancement on their commitment, declared at the prior year’s conference in The Hague, to elevate military expenditures to 5% of GDP by 2035 (the UK trails behind other nations). US President Donald Trump will be displeased, and Russian President Vladimir Putin will remain unaffected.
Startled and unsettled by the US president’s erratic conduct, Europeans have never held greater doubts about their American overlord. Nevertheless, they remain hesitant to shoulder the cost for liberation, remarks The Times columnist Edward Lucas.
Discussions are increasingly focused on establishing a European military force or employing the European Union as a substitute for NATO.
“Keep dreaming,” NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte communicated to the European Parliament’s defense and external affairs committees last month, pointing out that Europe would need to allocate 10% of its GDP to supersede American atomic and other armed capabilities.
Indeed, as per Robert Pszel, a past high-ranking NATO official currently employed at the OSW research center in Warsaw, Europe already contributes roughly two-thirds of the manpower essential for its own security, “but the outstanding third is exceptionally critical.” European satellite communication and intelligence infrastructures are insufficient and susceptible to Russian incursions.
Among the 100,000 American soldiers stationed in Europe or momentarily positioned here are two exceedingly significant armored brigade combat formations, alongside a less conspicuous yet crucial logistical element — the 21st Theater Logistics Command, headquartered in Kaiserslautern, Germany.
Europe lacks the “magnitude” of approximately 200,000 troops, coupled with the armaments and munitions that the United States could supply for support during a crisis; the sole genuinely extensive army in Europe currently is the Ukrainian one . Furthermore, European nations possess a constrained quantity of long-distance precision weaponry – the final means of discouraging conflict prior to a nuclear reaction.
“Even more concerning, the US might prove to be not just an unreliable partner, but also an adversary. What will transpire if Trump mandates that European allies pressure Ukraine into endorsing an unfavorable ceasefire accord? He will execute another peculiar endeavor to seize territory,” the columnist includes.
Will it attempt to diminish the EU’s regulatory authority? Or should MAGA proponents heighten pressure on what they perceive as detrimental, feeble European strategies? The US could unscrupulously exploit Europe’s defense vulnerability.
France, Germany, and Britain are engaging in confidential high-level conversations to enhance defense collaboration in order to manage a sudden decrease in the U.S. military presence, which could materialize as early as 2027, according to a report revealed to Reuters in December.
Sweden, formerly a steadfast advocate for the drive to prohibit atomic arms, is presently negotiating nuclear sharing with Britain and France. Poland is contemplating its individual nuclear agenda.
Progressing toward independence would signify not only substantial expenses, but additionally heightened hazards and more conservative goals. Europe would be compelled to forsake generously funded, superior American defense in favor of a more disjointed and precarious model of its own.
It would also entail bidding farewell to ambitions of global influence—in our instance, aircraft carriers, the Falklands, the Persian Gulf, and Australia—and concentrating solely on the more limited objective of deterring Russian hostility.
Lucas postulates that for a European NATO with a GDP of approximately £20 trillion and a populace exceeding 700 million, confronting Russia (GDP £2.5 trillion, populace 143 million) is entirely viable – at least theoretically and provided sufficient time. After all, Ukraine, significantly smaller and poorer, has been capable of nearly halting Putin’s war apparatus.
“It's regrettable, but we can scarcely assemble even a thousand combat-ready soldiers in Estonia. We justly protest that we are being excluded from defense agreements under the auspices of the EU. However, our neighbors are relegating us to the periphery for valid reasons,” the columnist asserts.
Regarding effective decision-making, the geopolitical center of influence in Europe has migrated north and east. With domestic politics rendering France and Germany excessively unstable, Britain ought to emulate the robust and unified states surrounding the Baltic Sea.
We can achieve considerably more presently: support Ukraine and exert pressure on Putin; confiscate Russian tankers and resources; intensify endeavors to aggravate the Kremlin’s financial, societal, and other predicaments.
“These constitute elements of a dependable Plan B. The more we undertake to safeguard ourselves, the less likely we are to require the original Plan A, which relies on US might and leadership. However, superseding the Americans without provoking them will be challenging. They may resent Europe’s frailty, but it provides them with leverage they will be unwilling to relinquish,” Lucas concluded.
Read about whether Europe will be able to fulfill Trump's demands in the article “5% of GDP on defense for European countries: how realistic is Donald Trump's demand” by Mykola Havrys.