© depositphotos/Ale_Mi Though, there’s no guarantee that it will be beneficial.
Supposing Donald Trump employs armed forces to exert control over Greenland, Denmark possesses alternatives apart from NATO.
The transatlantic partnership continues to be the foundation of Denmark’s safety, yet in a face-off with the United States, it’s improbable to act as a potent instrument – chiefly because the United States holds sway in NATO.
Alternatively, Copenhagen could turn to an obscure stipulation within the treaties of the European Union — Article 42.7, designated as the EU Joint Defense Agreement.
Certain specialists suggest that this arrangement is considerably more impactful than the notable Article 5 of NATO, although Article 42.7 includes numerous limitations and doubts.
Politico delved into five pivotal inquiries concerning the article — and whether it would be logical for Denmark to employ it.
1. What explicitly does Article 42.7 stipulate?
“In the event a Member State suffers armed aggression on its terrain, the remaining Member States are compelled to render it aid and support through all means at their disposal, consistent with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. This does not affect the distinct attributes of the security and protection strategies of each Member State.”
This condition was integrated into the 2009 Lisbon Accord to grant EU nations defense akin to that offered by NATO. It allows for some leeway for neutral nations to opt out.
Based on numerous specialists, the EU’s reciprocal assistance provision is deemed more compelling, given that it openly affirms the requirement to extend “all assistance and support through every accessible means.” NATO’s Article 5, conversely, utilizes the phrase “in such a way as each Party deems requisite,” thereby enabling greater latitude for national maneuvering.
“The EU’s wording is stricter in a diplomatic context, but its military strength pool is notably smaller than NATO’s,” clarifies Alexander Mattelaer, affiliated professor of global protection at the Free University of Brussels.
2. Has Article 42.7 seen prior application?
Merely on one occasion.
In 2015, France cited this article subsequent to assaults by ISIS combatants. This authorized Paris to reallocate a segment of its armed forces from Africa to oversee the streets of French cities, whereas other EU countries — including Germany — dispatched units to Mali and additional territories.
France’s plea was consistently endorsed by EU defense ministers. Bearing in mind that the European Union lacks its own military, Paris had to engage in discussions with each state individually pertaining to distinct types of military aid.
3. How does this system operate?
The impetus needs to stem from Denmark itself.
Following this, its appeal, similarly to France’s circumstance, necessitates unanimous consent from all EU member states.
Nonetheless, it’s the unanimity prerequisite that generates risks: Denmark may encounter an obstruction of the verdict from nations like Hungary, as disclosed by two European diplomats.
“I doubt Denmark would venture to cite this article devoid of assurance of unanimous backing — it would entail excessive hazard,” noted Antonio Missiroli, a past NATO assistant secretary general and former European Commission official.
“Will Hungary, for instance, align with Denmark in opposition to the United States?” he appended.
Legal ambiguity persists as to whether Article 42.7 pertains to the Greenland dilemma, which detached from the EU’s antecedent in 1985, albeit formally remaining an element of the Kingdom of Denmark.
On Sunday, European Commissioner for Defense Andrius Kubilius articulated that Article 42.7 could “assuredly” be employed, and the European Commission conveyed the identical stance the prior year.
Commission spokesperson Annitta Gipper elucidated:
“Greenland constitutes a segment of the territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, consequently, it is, in principle, prone to the mutual aid condition within Article 42.7.”
4. What transpires post activation?
Fruitful enactment of the article would dispatch “an exceptionally robust political and lawful indication,” states Sven Biskop, director general of the Egmont think tank and a specialist on European safety.
The mechanism refrains from obligating the EU itself to intervene straightforwardly – verdicts concerning further actions are adopted by the capitals of the member states, predominantly by the nation that commenced the implementation of the article.
Viable measures encompass symbolic proclamations of unity, fiscal assistance, or potentially even military backing, clarified one EU diplomat. Missiroli proposed that Denmark could leverage Article 42.7, notably, to request mediation from another state.
“It remains premature to ascertain what the practical response would entail,” articulated one European government official. “However, we shall furnish the sort of support we would desire in a parallel scenario.”
Furthermore, the article could forge a legitimate foundation for the instatement of economic penalties, notes Bishop.
German MEP Sergei Lagodinsky advocated for the composition of a “thorough compilation of conceivable counteractions” in the instance of Article 42.7 being cited — encompassing the expulsion of US troops from European bases, a prohibition on US aircraft overflights, and constraints on access for US enterprises to the EU market.
The activation of the article could similarly encompass the constrained deployment of forces from the EU Military Committee and Military Staff, advisory entities comprising the chief generals of member states and military delegates in Brussels.
However, specialists are in agreement: the likelihood of the EU engaging in warfare with the US is nonexistent. Even given the desire, Brussels possesses merely a handful of military staff officers, a petite command framework competent in overseeing a maximum of three thousand soldiers, alongside exceptionally constrained proficiency beyond peacekeeping endeavors.
Concurrently, individual member states may resolve upon ampler military aid utilizing their respective resources.
Simultaneously, the extent of the countries’ authentic obligations remains indefinite, implying that Denmark may confront a political actuality wherein certain capitals confine themselves to trivial support.
It is owing to these deficiencies that Kubilius last month disclosed his resolve to commence a discourse this year on “institutional defense preparedness,” which could encompass overhauling Article 42.7 to render it fully operational — entailing a lucid procedure and an integrated military command.
5. What implications would this hold for NATO?
Denmark has already cautioned that the US seizure of Greenland would signify the conclusion of the Alliance — albeit Trump dissents.
Should the US orchestrate the capture of the island, it “would not necessarily entail the legal termination of NATO, but it would politically undermine its authority,” remarks Fabrice Pothier, chief of the consulting enterprise Rasmussen Global.
This may propel specific EU nations to pursue “more European resolutions” and imbue Article 42.7 with genuine significance.
Nevertheless, such a route would entail the establishment of a novel security configuration within Europe absent the involvement of the United States, the state that has functioned as the principal guarantor of continental safety since World War II.
“NATO bears accountability for collective defense in the Euro-Atlantic zone: it possesses defense strategies, command frameworks, and capability objectives,” one of the Alliance diplomats noted. “The EU, for its allocation, boasts financial prowess, industrial policy, and regulatory influence.”